

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES LYNN O'HINES,
CDCR #K-86989,
ADC #197067,

Plaintiff,

vs.

JANET NAPOLITANO, Governor, et al.,

Defendants.

Civil No. 08-1448 J (CAB)

**ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
PROCEED *IN FORMA PAUPERIS*
AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
[Doc. No. 2]**

AND

**DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION
WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR
FAILURE TO PAY CIVIL FILING
FEES MANDATED BY
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)**

Plaintiff, an inmate currently incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison Complex in Florence, Arizona, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other unrelated federal criminal statutes.¹ (Compl. at 1.)

Plaintiff has not prepaid the \$350 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead he has submitted a Motion to Proceed *In Forma Pauperis* ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2].

¹ The Court notes that Plaintiff was formerly a California state inmate. It is unclear whether he is currently a California state inmate housed temporarily in Arizona, or whether he is now serving an Arizona prison sentence.

I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

Section 1915 of Title 28 of the United States Code allows certain litigants to pursue civil litigation IFP, that is, without the full prepayment of fees or costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). However, the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP:

. . . if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). "This subdivision is commonly known as the 'three strikes' provision." *Andrews v. King*, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (hereafter "*Andrews*"). "Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP." *Id.*; see also *Andrews v. Cervantes*, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter "*Cervantes*") (Under the PLRA, "[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]"). The objective of the PLRA is to further "the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court." *Tierney v. Kupers*, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997).

"'Strikes' are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which were dismissed 'on the ground that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to state a claim.'" *Andrews*, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1. Thus, once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, he is prohibited by section 1915(g) from pursuing any other action IFP in federal court unless he is under "imminent danger of serious physical injury." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); *Cervantes*, 493 F.3d at 1051-52 (noting § 1915(g)'s exception for IFP complaints which "make[] a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced 'imminent danger of serious physical injury' at the time of filing.>").

While the PLRA does not require a prisoner to declare that § 1915(g) does not bar his request to proceed IFP, *Andrews*, 398 F.3d at 1119, "[i]n some instances, the district court

1 docket records may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one of the criteria
2 under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” *Id.* at 1120. When applying 28 U.S.C.
3 § 1915(g), however, the court must “conduct a careful evaluation of the order dismissing an
4 action, and other relevant information,” before determining that the action “was dismissed
5 because it was frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim,” since “not all unsuccessful cases
6 qualify as a strike under § 1915(g).” *Id.* at 1121.

7 The Ninth Circuit has held that “the phrase ‘fails to state a claim on which relief may be
8 granted,’ as used elsewhere in § 1915, ‘parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9 12(b)(6).’” *Id.* at 1121 (quoting *Barren v. Harrington*, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)).
10 *Andrews* further holds that a case is “frivolous” for purposes of § 1915(g) “if it is of little weight
11 or importance” or “ha[s] no basis in law or fact.” 398 F.3d at 1121 (citations omitted); *see also*
12 *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (“[A] complaint, containing as it does both factual
13 allegations and legal conclusions, is frivolous [under 28 U.S.C. § 1915] where it lacks an
14 arguable basis in either law or in fact [The] term ‘frivolous,’ when applied to a complaint,
15 embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual allegation.”). “A
16 case is malicious if it was filed with the intention or desire to harm another.” *Andrews*, 398 F.3d
17 at 1121 (quotation and citation omitted).

18 II.

19 APPLICATION OF 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

20 The Court notes as an initial matter that while Plaintiff’s claims are practically impossible
21 to decipher, it has carefully reviewed the Complaint and has ascertained that it makes no
22 “plausible allegation” to suggest Plaintiff “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’
23 at the time of filing.” *Cervantes*, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Therefore,
24 Plaintiff may be barred from proceeding IFP in this action if he has on three prior occasions had
25 civil actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious or for failing to state a claim. *See* 28
26 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

27 A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the
28 federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” *Bias v.*

1 *Moynihan*, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting *Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc.*, 285 F.3d
2 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); *see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens*
3 *Council v. Borneo, Inc.*, 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, the Court takes judicial notice
4 that Plaintiff has had more than three prior prisoner civil actions dismissed on the grounds that
5 they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted
6 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. *See Hines v. City of San Diego Police Dep't*,
7 Civil Case No. 00-0969 K (LAB) (S.D. Cal. June 21, 1999) (Order dismissing complaint for
8 failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) & 1915A(b)(1)) (strike one);
9 *Malloy v. Kowolski*, Civil Case No. 00-1186 W (LAB) (S.D. Cal. June 30, 2000) (Order
10 dismissing complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)) (strike two); *Hines v.*
11 *Hissong*, Civil Case No. 00-1177 JM (NLS) (S.D. Cal. July 14, 2000) (Order dismissing
12 complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)) (strike three); *Malloy v. Corcoran*
13 *Prison*, Civil Case No. 00-5660 REC (DLB) (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2000) (Order dismissing
14 complaint as frivolous) (strike four); *Hines v. Jaffe*, Civil Case No. 00-2078 W (CGA) (S.D. Cal.
15 Nov. 7, 2000) (Order dismissing complaint as frivolous) (strike five); *Malloy v. Galaza*, Civil
16 Case No. 00-5647 AWI (HGB) (E.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2000) (Order dismissing action for failing
17 to state a claim) (strike six); and *Malloy v. Corcoran Prison*, Civil Case No. 99-6647 REC
18 (SMS) (E.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2000) (Order dismissing complaint as frivolous and for failing to state
19 a claim) (strike seven).

20 Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated more than three
21 “strikes” pursuant to § 1915(g), and fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he is under
22 imminent danger of serious physical injury, he is not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP
23 in this action. *See Andrews v. Cervantes*, 493 F.3d at 1055; *Rodriguez*, 169 F.3d at 1180
24 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it
25 only precludes prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it
26 while enjoying IFP status”); *see also Franklin v. Murphy*, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984)
27 (“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.”).

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III.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER


For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby **DENIES** Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed *In Forma Pauperis* as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) [Doc. No. 2], and **DISMISSES** this action without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) for failing to prepay the \$350 filing fee. Plaintiff is once again reminded that he may no longer proceed IFP in any federal district or appellate court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) while he is incarcerated unless he is in "imminent danger of serious physical injury." See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Further, this Court **CERTIFIES** that any IFP appeal from this Order would not be taken "in good faith" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See *Coppedge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); *Gardner v. Pogue*, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not be frivolous).

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 8-15-08



HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, Jr.
United States District Judge